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Eaton: Eaton: Arbitration Agreements in Labor

NOTES

Arbitration Agreements in
Labor and Employment Contracts:
Well Within the Reach of the FAA
n '
CircuitCity Stores, Inc. v. Adams

I. INTRODUCTION
Despite a series of decisions where the Supreme Court has upheld the use of
arbitration in the employment context, the Court has never clearly stated that
arbitration agreements contained in employment contracts fall under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA). This omission has led to a split in the Circuits as to the scope
of the FAA coverage ad exemption provisions. The controversy centers on whether
the FAA covers all employment contracts except those of employees who transport
people or goods in interstate commerce or whether the FAA exempts all employment
contracts.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Saint Clair Adams (Adams) was hired as a sales counselor by the Circuit City2
store in Santa Rosa, California, in October, 1995. On October 23, 1995, Adams
completed a six-page application to work at Circuit City Stores (Circuit City)?
Within the application Adams signed a document entitled "Circuit City Dispute
Resolution Agreement" (DRA).4 The DRA requires that employees submit all
claims and disputes to mutually binding arbitration 5 "An employee cannot work at

I. Circuit City Stores Inc. v.Adams,532 U.S. 105 (2001).
2. Circuit City is anational retailer of consumer electronics. Id.
3. Circuit City Stores,Inc. v.Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999).
4. Id.

5. The DRA specifies that job applicants agree to settle:
all previously unasserted claims, disputes or controversies arising out of or relating to my
application or candidacy for employment, employment and/or cessation ofemployment with Circuit
City, exclusively by final and binding arbitration before a neutral Arbitrator. By way ofexample
only, such claims include claims under federal, state, and local statutory or common law, such as
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
including the amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
law of contract and law of tort.
Id.at n. 1.
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Circuit City without signing the DRA."6 Adams was employed by Circuit City until
he resigned in November of 1996, complaining of constructive discharge.7
Adams filed an employment discrimination lawsuit under the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and other general state law tort claims
against Circuit City in state court.8 In response, Circuit City filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking to enjoin the
state-court action and to compel mutually binding arbitration of Adams' claims
pursuant to the FAA. 9 The district court concluded that Adams was required by the
arbitration agreement and the FAA to submit his claims against Circuit City to
binding arbitration.' ° Adams appealed the district courtes order staying the state
court action and compelling arbitration."
While Adams' appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
in an unrelated case, Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., ruled on the key issue of whether
the FAA applies to labor or employment contracts and held that the FAA does not
apply to labor or employment contracts. 12 The court in CircuitCity, following the
rule announced in Craft, held the arbitration agreement between Adams and Circuit
City was not subject to the FAA because it was contained in a "contract of
employment. '"'3 The court noted that section four of the FAA provides for an order
compelling arbitration only when the federal district court would have jurisdiction
over a suit on the underlying dispute; hence, there must be diversity of citizenship
or some other basis for federal jurisdiction. 4 Thus, the court reversed the district
court's order compelling arbitration and remanded the case to the district court for
dismissal because of a lack of federal jurisdiction under section four of the FAA to
compel arbitration.'"
Circuit City petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, noting that the
Ninth Circuitfs conclusion that all employment contracts are excluded from the FAA
was contrary to the majority of circuits who have interpreted the FAA. The majority
of circuits held the FAA applied to all employment contracts, except for contracts

6. If"an employee signs the DRA and then withdraws consent within three days, the employee 'will
no longer be eligible for employment at Circuit City."' Id.
7. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 2000 WL 1132951 48a (N.D. Cal. April 3, 1998).

8. Adams alleged he experienced discrimination and harassment by his employer based on his sexual
orientation. Id.
9. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109. Section four of the FAA provides, "[a] party aggrieved by the alleged
failure ... ofanother to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States
district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28... for an order
directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 4
(1994).

10. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109.
11. Circuit City, 194 F.3d at 1071.

12.
13.
14.
15.

Craft, 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
Circuit City, 194 F.3d at 1071-72.
Id. at 1071.
Id. at 1071-72.
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of employees who actually transport people or goods in interstate commerce.' 6 The
Supreme Court granted Circuit City's petition for writ of certiorari. 7
Reversing the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held
that an arbitration agreement contained within a contract of employment is within
the reach of the FAA. The Court stated the text of section one does not allow the
exclusion provision to defeat the language of section two as to all employment
contracts, but only exempts the contracts of employment of transportation workers
from the FAA."8 To hold otherwise, the Court explained, would be to give "an
expansive construction of the FAA exclusion provision that goes beyond the
meaning of the words Congress used."' 9

m. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The FederalArbitrationAct
"The Federal Arbitration Act was originally enacted in 1925 and then reenacted
and codified in 1947 as Title 9 of the United States Code."20 Its purpose "was to
reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements ... and to place
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts."'" To that end,
section two of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements "in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce... shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in

16. CircuitCity, 532 U.S. at 109. See e.g. McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573,575-76 (10th
Cir. 1998) ("The workers engaged in interstate commerce exclusion does not encompass all employment
contracts, just those of employees actually engaged in channels of interstate commerce."); O'Neil v.
Hilton HeadHosp., 115 F.3d 272,274 (4th Cir. 1997) ("The circuit courts have uniformly reasoned that
the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration requires a narrow reading of this section one
exemption."); Pryner v. TractorSupply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997); Cole v. Burns Intern.
Sec. Services, 105 F.3d 1465, 1470-71 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[S]ection I of the FAA does not exclude all
contracts of employment that affect commerce" but "exempts only the employment contracts of workers
actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce."); Rojas v. TK Communications.
Inc., 87 F.3d 745,747-48 (5th Cir. 1996) (Section one exempts only contracts of employment of workers
engaged in the movement of goods in commerce.); Asplundh TreeExpert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592,60001 (6th Cir. 1995) (Section one "should be narrowly construed to apply to employment contracts of
seamen, railroad workers, and any other class of workers actually engaged in the movement of goods
in interstate commerce."); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir.
1972) (Section one applies "only to those actually in the transportation industry."); Dickstein v. duPont,
443 F.2d 783,785 (1st Cir. 1971) (Section one is limited to employees "involved in, or closely related
to, the actual movement of goods in interstate commerce."); Tenney Engineering,Inc. v. United Elec.
Radio & Mach. Workers of America, (UE.) Local 437,207 F.2d 450,452 (3d Cir. 1953) (Section one
applies only to workers "who are actually engaged in the movement of interstate or foreign commerce
or in work so closely related thereto as to be in practical effect part of it.").
17. Circuit City v. Adams, 529 U.S. 1129 (2000) (The petition for write of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court was granted and limited the question to the issue presented in the petition.).
18. Circuit City, 523 U.S. at 118-19.
19. Id. at 106.
20. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Services, 105 F.3d 1465, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
21. Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20,24 (1991).
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equity for the revocation of any contract."' Section one of the FAA, however, states
that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
23
commerce."
B. Interpretingthe Section One Exemption ProvisionNarrowly
A few courts interpret section one broadly and argue that it exempts all contracts
of employment that facilitate or affect commerce (even tangentially) from the
coverage provisions of section two of the FAA.24 A far greater number of courts
interpret the section one exemption provision narrowly, and hold that it exempts only
the employment contracts of workers actually engaged in the transportation of goods
25
in commerce.
This issue was raised, but not decided, in Gilmerv. Johnson/InterstateLane.26
In that case, Gilmer had been required, as a condition of his employment, to register
as a securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange. The registration
application contained an agreement to arbitrate any controversy arising out of
Gilmer's employment or termination of employment. When Gilmer was terminated
at age sixty-two, he brought suit in federal court alleging age discrimination under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and his employer sought to
compel arbitration. 2' The Supreme Court acknowledged, but failed to resolve, the
issue of the scope of section one exclusion of contracts of employment, finding that
2
the arbitration agreement at issue was not part of a contract of employment.
I. Avoiding redundancy
The rationale for a narrow reading of section one is twofold. One of the canons
of statutory interpretation holds that courts should "avoid a reading of statutory
language which renders some words altogether redundant." 29 This canon has
implications for interpreting both section one and section two. Secondly, the canon

22. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Although "courts may not invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws
applicable only to arbitration provisions," general contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability, grounded in state contract law, may invalidate arbitration agreements. First Options
ofChicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
23. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
24. See Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1067-68 (4th Cir.
1993); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1120 (3d Cir. 1993)
(ignoring conflicting precedent in Tenney); United Food and Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7R
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 889 F.2d 940,943-44 (10th Cir. 1989).
25. Cole, 105 F.3d 1465.
26. Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20.
27. Id. at 23-24.
28. Id. at 25 n. 2.
29. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1470 (citations omitted).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2002/iss1/13

4

2002]

Eaton: Eaton: Arbitration Agreements in Labor
Arbitration Agreements in Labor and Employment Contracts

197

of ejusdem generislimits general terms which follow specific ones to matters similar
to those specified. 0
Applying the redundancy canon to section two coverage provisions, the
Supreme Court determined in PrimaPaintCorp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. that
the contract at issue did evidence a "transaction" in interstate commerce, as required
by section two." However, the Court did not go so far as to construe the statute3to
2
apply only to contracts between merchants for the interstate shipment of goods.
Such a narrowing of the statute, the Court held, would make Congress' amendment
of the statute to exclude certain kinds of employment contracts in section one
unnecessary.33
2. Ejusdem generis
The second applicable statutory canon which supports a narrow reading of
section one is the rule of ejusdem generis. In this statute, the general phrase, "any
other class ofworkers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," takes its meaning
from the specific terms preceding it, "seamen" and "railroad employees."' The
Sixth Circuit noted that under the rule of ejusdem generis, section one excludes only
those other classes of workers who are likewise engaged directly in commerce, that
is, "only those other classes of workers who are actually engaged in the movement
of interstate or foreign commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to be in
practical effect pe-t of it."3
3. Past precedent
The narrow interpretation of the exemption clause in section one is also
supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson.3 ' Allied-Bruce involved the interpretation of section two of the FAA,
specifically, whether the language-"a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce"-extended the Act's reach to the full limits of Congress' commerce

30. Id. at 1471 (citations omitted).
31. 388 U.S. 395, 400-01 (1967) (the contract at issue was a consulting agreement between two
businesses to arrange a transfer of manufacturing and selling operations from New Jersey to Maryland).
32. Id.
33. ld. See also Rojas v. TK Commun., Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying a broad
meaning to the term "commerce" in section one itself would rob the rest of the exclusion clause of all
significance); Cole, 105 F.3d at 1470 (If the final phrase of the exclusionary clause-"any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"--extended to all workers whose jobs have any effect
on commerce, the specific inclusion of seamen and railroad employees in the exemption provision would
have been unnecessary.).
34. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1471
35. Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Tenney
Engineering, Inc. v. UnitedElec., Radio & Machine Workers ofAmerica, Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 452
(3d Cir. 1953)).
36. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
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clause powers." To reach its holding that section two did reach to the limits of the
commerce clause, the Court analyzed the phrase "involving commerce" with respect
to the phrases "in commerce" and "affecting commerce," which is found in the
exclusionary clause of section one."
"Involving commerce" is broader than the common words of art "in commerce"
and therefore covers more than "only persons or activities within the flow of
interstate commerce."39 The Court examines the statute's language, background, and
structure then concludes that the word "involving" is broad and is the functional
equivalent of "affecting."' ° The phrase "affecting commerce" usually signals
Congress' intent to exercise its Commerce Clause powers to the full.4' This analysis
strongly suggests that exclusion provision in section one covers only those workers
actually involved in the "flow" of commerce, for example, those workers responsible
for the transportation and distribution of goods.42
The Court did address the contrary argument that when Congress passed the
FAA in 1925, it may have thought that the Commerce Clause would not extend as
far as it actually has.43 However, the Court notes that it is "not unusual for this Court
in similar circumstances to ask whether the scope of a statute should expand along
with the expansion of the Commerce Clause power itself, and to answer the question
affirmatively--as, for the reasons set forth above, we do here."' The Allied-Bruce
Court did not rely on the legislative history of the statute, because they felt it is "at
best, secondary, and at worst, irrelevant," because the statutory text is not ambiguous
and case law is "absolutely clear" on the meaning of the statute."5 However, other
courts argue that the statute is ambiguous so that the scope of the Commerce Clause
in 1925 as well as the FAA legislative history offer compelling insight into the
statute's meaning.
C. Ninth CircuitReliance on Legislative Historyfor
CorrectInterpretationof Section One
The Ninth Circuit is adamant that to understand whether Congress intended for
the FAA to apply to employment contracts, there must first be a review of Congress'
commerce power in 1925, before the Supreme Court dramatically expanded the
meaning of interstate commerce in the 1930s.' So before it applied either of the

37. Id. at 273.
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting US. v. American Building Maint.Indus., 422 U.S. 271,276 (1975)).
40. Id. at 274.
41. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co.. Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,273. See Russell v. UnitedStates, 471
U.S. 858, 859 (1985).
42. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1472.
43. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 275.
44. Id.
45. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1472.
46. Craft, 177 F.3d at 1086.
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previous two canons of statutory interpretation mentioned, the Ninth 47
Circuit in Craft
v. CampbellSoup Co., looked first at the words that Congress used.
The court turned to the ordinary meaning of the phrase "contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce," and stated that an individual employment contract
would not seem to fall within the ordinary concept of a contract "evidencing a
transaction," even if it involves interstate commerce."8 The court referred to the
meaning of "transaction" when Congress passed the FAA in 1925, and noted that it
commonly meant "a business deal; an act involving buying and selling."' 9 An
employment contract, the court said, is not commonly referred to as either a
Instead, the
"business deal" or as "an act involving buying and selling.""
connotation of the phrase "transaction involving commerce," as Congress would
have meant it in 1925, was of a commercial deal or a merchant's sale." Congress'
Commerce Clause power at the time of the FAA enactment was limited to employees
who actually transported people or goods in interstate commerce.52 Congress simply
did not have the power to legislate employment contracts of accountants or
secretaries even if they worked for railroads or steamship companies. 3 Under these
circumstances, the Ninth Circuit concluded that section two of the FAA appeared not
to encompass employment contracts at all.' Furthermore, section one exempted
those very same employees from the scope of the FAA. 5
However, that the language of section one of the FAA might also suggest that
Congress intended for section two to apply to some collective bargaining agreements
and employment contracts, makes the Ninth Circuit view the statute as a whole as
ambiguous.' The ambiguity allows the court to take into account the legislative
history of the FAA, which demonstrates that the Act's purpose was solely to bind

47. Id. at 1084-85.
48. Id. at 1085.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Matthew Finkin, Employment Contracts Under the FAA-Reconsidered, 48 Lab. L.J. 329, 333
(1997) (It was "irrelevant whether or not the statute dealt with employees 'in' interstate commerce,
'engaged in' interstate commerce or who were 'involved in' interstate commerce, for however the statute
was phrased, these employees were wholly outside the power of Congress to regulate at the time and
Congress could not have intended to include them.").
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1087. See Arce v. Cotton Club of Greenville Inc., 883 F. Supp. 117, 123 (N.D. Miss. 1995)
("Interstate commerce at the time the FAA was enacted was generally understood to be limited to
maritime and railroad transactions. Thus, when Congress excluded employment contracts of maritime
and railroad workers, it resulted in voiding the power to enforce arbitration clauses of most employment
contracts. With the addition of the catch-all phrase 'or any other class of worker engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce,' all employment contracts would have been excluded from the arbitration
enforcement power of the FAA.") (emphasis added). See also Finkin, supra n. 53, at 334 ("When the Act
was passed in 1925, Congress excluded all contracts of employment over which it then had
jurisdiction.").
56. Id.
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merchants who were involved in commercial dealings." Finally, the Craftcourt is
critical of the inconsistent effect many courts' redefinition of the phrase "involving
commerce," to cover all productive activities, has on the exemption provision."
Courts had developed two interpretations of the FAA provisions: Congress did
not intend for the FAA to apply to any employment contracts or Congress intended
for the FAA to apply to all employment contracts, except for the contracts of
employees who actually transport people or goods in interstate commerce.59
However, the Supreme Court had not yet definitively ruled on whether the FAA
applied to labor and employment contracts. 6°
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In CircuitCity, the Supreme Court had to decide whether the FAA applied to
labor and employment contracts thereby requiring them to overturn the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals and give effect to the arbitration agreement between Circuit City
and Adams by compelling arbitration.6 '
A. The Majority
1. Section two extends coverage to employment contracts
The Court began its interpretation of the FAA62 by focusing upon the words
"transaction" and "involving commerce" within the FAA coverage provision.
Specifically, section two provides that a "written provision in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transactioninvolving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction...
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 3
The Supreme Court dismissed Adams' argument that the word "transaction" in
section two extends coverage to commercial contracts only, thereby excluding
employment contracts from FAA coverage." If this analysis proved correct, the
Court reasoned that the separate exemption for "contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in . . . interstate

57. Craft, 177 F.3d at 1089.
58. Id. at 1088. The Ninth Circuit argues that under current law, the right answer is that the FAA
should keep its 1925 definition. Otherwise, courts wrongly expand the coverage "involving commerce"
to keep the FAA in play.
59. Id. at 1085.
60. Id. at 1090.
61. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109 (Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined.).
62. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).

63. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
64. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 113.
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commerce" would be redundant and pointless.6 Moreover, such an interpretation
is inconsistent with the Court's holding in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,
where the Court held that section two required the arbitration of a dispute that did
not rise out of a commercial deal,' and the Court's expansive reading of those words
adopted inAllied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson.6" The Court inAllied-Bruce found
that the FAA was enacted to implement Congress' intent to "exercise its commerce
power to the full."68
2. Section one must be read narrowly
The exemption clause under section one of the FAA, which provides the Act
shall not apply "to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
'
must be
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"69
0
evaluated in light of the expansive meaning given to section two. Adams, adopting
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, seized upon the expansive construction of section two
coverage provision adopted by the Court inAllied-Bruce, and argued that section one
interpretation should be just as broad, thus exempting all employment contracts."'
The Court pointed out the inconsistency of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the
section one exemption as excluding all contracts of employment from the reach of
the FAA, with the majority of the Courts of Appeals, which have concluded that the
exclusion provision is limited to transportation workers. 2
To counter Adams' interpretation of the clause, the Court applied the theory of
ejusdem generis, a means of statutory interpretation that provides when construing
a statute, the meaning of general terms that follow specific ones should be limited
to matters similar to those specified. 3 Thus, the Court reads the residual clause in
section one as giving effect to the terms "seamen" and "railroad employees" because
otherwise there would be no need for Congress to use those phrases if those classes

65. Id. at 114.
66. 500 U.S. 20 (The claim in this case was an age discrimination claim based on an agreement in a
securities registration application.).
67. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 277, 279-80.
68. CircuitCity, 532 U.S. at 112 (quoting Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 277). See PrimaPaint,388 U.S.
at 405 ("[lIt is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to the
incontestable federal foundations of control over interstate commerce and over admiralty."); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1(1994) (The FAA is applicable in state courts and pre-emptive of state laws
hostile to arbitration.).
69. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
70. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 113.
71. Id. Adams is arguing that the two provisions are coterminous. In other words, the "involving
comierce" provision puts within the FAA reach all contracts within the Congress' commerce power,
and the "engaged in ... commerce" language in section one in turn exempts from the FAA all
employment contracts falling within that authority.
72. See Cole, 105 F3d at 1471.
73. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114-15. See Norman J. Singer, Statutes andStatutory Construction§
47.17 (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1992); Norfolk& Western. R. Co. v. TrainDispatchers,499 U.S. 117,
129 (1991).
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of workers were subsumed within the meaning of the "engaged in... commerce"
residual clause. 4
To bolster support for its position that the FAA does not
exclude all contracts
of employment, the Supreme Court relies on Congress' use of different modifiers to
the word "commerce" within the statute." The Court evaluates the various modifiers
as they relate to the phrase "affecting commerce" which indicates "Congress' intent
to regulate to the outer limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause. 17 6 The
Supreme Court in Allied-Bruce addressed the meaning of "involving," looking at the
usual meaning of the word as well as the pro-arbitration purposes of the FAA, and
held that the word "involving" like "affecting" signals an intent to exercise
Congress' commerce power to the full. 77 However, the general words "in
commerce" and the specific phrase "engaged in commerce" are understood by the
Court to have a more limited reach."8
Adams asked the Court to follow a mode of statutory interpretation that would
involve taking into account the scope of the Commerce Clause at the time the FAA
was enacted. 79 Without making a thorough analysis of the Commerce Clause, the
Court dismisses this argument because it would contradict earlier cases, cause
instability in statutory interpretation, and would be unwieldy for all parties.8s In
addition, such a means of interpretation ignores the reason why the formulation of
words became a term of art in the first place, namely that the plain meaning of the
words "engaged in commerce" is narrower than the more open-ended "affecting
commerce" and "involving commerce."'" This is not to say, however, that the Court
thinks it may decide to construe the "engaged in commerce" language in the FAA
without reference to the statutory context in which it is found and in a manner
consistent with the FAA purpose."2 However, these considerations still point to a
narrow construction of section one, exempting only the employment contracts of
transportation workers from the FAA."3
The Supreme Court based its decision on the text of section one and stated that
it did not need to look at the legislative history of the exclusion provision; however,
the Court does note that its decision does not attribute an irrational intent to

74. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quotingAllied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 277).
78. Id. In Allied-Bruce, the Court noted that the words "in commerce" are "often-found words of art,"
that have not been read as expressing congressional intent to regulate to the outer limits of authority
under the Commerce Clause. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273. See also US. v. Am. Bldg. Maint.Ind., 422
U.S. 271, 279-80 (1975) (the phrase "engaged in commerce" is "a term of art, indicating a limited
assertion of federal jurisdiction"); Jones v. US., 529 U.S. 848, 855 (2000) (phrase "used in commerce"
"is most sensibly read to mean active employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a passive,
passing, or past connection to commerce").
79. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 116.
80. Id. at 117-18.
81. Id. at 117-18.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 118-19.
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Congress." The Court also deflects the criticism of various amici who argue that by
requiring arbitration agreements in most employment contracts to be covered by the
FAA, the statute effectively preempts state employment laws to the contrary. 5 The
Court argues that this criticism is misplaced because in the present case the FAA is
being applied in a federal, rather than in a state court
The Court fmished its
analysis by citing the benefits to be had by the enforcement of arbitration agreements
and warning that Adams' interpretation of section one would cause considerable
complexity and uncertainty which would, in turn, call into doubt the efficacy of
alternative dispute resolution procedures and the FAA pro-arbitration purposes.87
B. The Dissent
1. The majority is ignoring important legislative history
The dissent s8 argues that the reliance the majority places on recent Court of
Appeals decisions makes it appropriate to delve into the legislative history of the
statute.s Looking at the history of the FAA, the dissent argues that it is clear that
neither the drafting of the original bill by the ABA, nor the records of Congressional
deliberations during the years leading up to the enactment of the Act in 1925, contain
any evidence that the proponents of the legislation intended it to apply to agreements
affecting employment."
In fact, the original bill was opposed by representatives of organized labor,
including the president of the International Seamen's Union of America, because
they were concerned that the legislation might authorize federal judicial enforcement
of arbitration clauses in employment contracts and collective-bargaining
agreements. 9' In response to their objections, the chairman of the ABA committee
that drafted the legislation advised the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee that although
"it is not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes at all," the
Subcommittee could amend the bill to include the language: "but nothing herein

84. Id. at 121. The Court noted that there is no paradox in the Congressional decision to exempt the
workers over whom the commerce power was most apparent (seamen and railroad employees) because
Congress already had authority to govern those employment relationships by the enactment of statutes
specific to them, including dispute resolution schemes covering specific workers.
85. Id. at 121-22.
86. Id. The Court says the criticism is relevant to the Court's decision in SouthlandCorp., 465 U.S.
at 15-16 (holding that Congress intended the FAA to apply in state courts, and to preempt state antiarbitration laws to the contrary).
87. Id. at 123.
88. Id. at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Stevens was joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, and by
Justice Souter as to Parts 11and III).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 125. The Court notes that the original bill was drafted upon considerataion of "the further

extension of the principle of commercial arbitration." Report ofthe Forty-thirdAnnual Meeting of the
ABA, 45 A.B.A. Rep. 75 (1920). Furthermore, members of Congress understood the bill as giving an
"opportunity to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and admiralty contracts." 65 Cong. Rec.
1931 (1924).
91. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 126-27.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

11

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2002, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 13
JOURNAL OFDISPUTE RESOLUTION
[Vol. 2002, No. I
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen or any class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. "' This is the amendment that assuaged
organized labor's opposition to the proposed law and, as the dissent accuses, fulfills
the original fears of organized labor by essentially rewriting the text of section one.93
The dissent believes the Court "play[ed] ostrich to the substantial history behind the
amendment" and argues that the clarifying amendment adopted to eliminate
opposition to the bill was not pointless."
The idea endorsed by this Court, that only employees engaged in interstate
transportation are excluded by section one, was not expressed until 1954 by the
Third Circuit.9' The fact that the Fourth Circuit rejected the idea shortly after, and
a conflict among the Circuits persisted throughout the 1950s suggests that attaching
as much weight to recent Court of Appeals opinions as the Court does in this case
while ignoring the history surrounding the statute, may be inappropriate.' The
majority is warned that it is misuing its authority when it refuses to look beyond the
text of the statute and take into account the opinions expressed by the enacting
Congress, in effect ignoring the interests of unrepresented employees in favor of its
policy preferences for arbitration.97
2. The hurdles to an evolutionary reading of section one
Justice Souter's dissente s focuses on the question of whether the phrase in the
section one exemption, referring to contracts of "any ... class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce," should receive an evolutionary reading, so as to
expand the exemption for employment contracts to keep pace with the enhanced
reach of the general enforceability provision.' Courts of Appeals have largely
rejected the evolutionary reading of section one accepted by the Ninth Circuit in this
case."® There are two hurdles that seemingly prevent the section one exemption
from growing alongside the expanding section two coverage provision.' First, the
language ofthe coverage is different from the language ofthe exemption.'0" Second,
the "engaged in... commerce" catchall phrase in the exemption follows the more
specific exemptions for employment contracts of "seamen" and "railroad

92. Id.at 127.
93. Id.at 129.

94. Id. at 128.
95. Id. at 130.
96. Id. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (implying that the Court
believes the FAA does not apply to collective-bargaining agreements because section one exempts labor

contracts).
97. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 132.
98. Id. at 133 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, J.J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 134.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 135.
102. Id.
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employees."' 3 The dissent argues that neither of these hurdles is a bar." 4 With
regard to the first hurdle, the dissent asserts there is no good reason to reject a
reading of "engaged in" as an expression of intent to legislate to the full extent of the
commerce power over employment contracts." 5
As for the second hurdle, although the majority sees the sequence of the words
as requiring an application of ejusdem generis, the dissent argues that there are good
reasons not to apply the maxim. °" The dissent concludes its argument by asserting
that there is nothing that prevents the coverage and exclusion clauses from being
construed together in a consistent and coherent manner. 7
V. COMMENT
A. The Supreme Court and Statutory Canons
The Supreme Court in Circuit City clearly followed the majority position by
interpreting the FAA section two coverage broadly and bringing all employees into
the reach of the FAA.0 8 Likewise, its narrow reading of the section one exemption
clause, exempting only transportation workers from the FAA coverage, is also
consistent with the majority of Courts of Appeals to have decided this issue."° And
to the extent that the Supreme Court itself had addressed related issues, such as the
the scope of section two, the instant decision is consistent with past decisions.
The Court began its analysis with the coverage provision in section two of the
FAA. The Court noted that it read the coverage provision broadly in accordance
with the precedent set in PrimaPaintand Allied-Bruce and then immediately turned
its focus to the section one exemption clause. "' The majority does not address in
any depth what the dissent considers the preliminary issue: whether employment
contracts fall under the FAA in the first place. The majority's logic follows Cole
when they decide that section two must have a broad scope; to read it narrowly--as
applying to only a few types of contracts--would make section one unnecessary and
redundant. In other words, if the FAA only applied to commercial contracts as the
dissent argues, and not employment contracts, there would be no need to then

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 137. The Court reviewed its decision in Allied-Brucewhere the Court held that the phrase
"involving commerce" had the same expansive reach as "affecting commerce" and reached the same
conclusion about "engaged in commerce." The latter phrase, within the context of the time, allows for
an interpretation that employment contracts are exempted from the FAA. Id. at 135-36.
106. Id. at 138. The dissent agrees with Adams' argument that it does not make sense to say that
Congress made sure to prevent the FAA from applying to the class of employment contracts it actually
had the authority to legislate in 1925 (contracts of workers employed by carriers and handlers of
commerce). Id. It would have made more sense either to cover all employment contracts or to exclude
them all. Id.
107. Id. at 140.
108. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1470.
109. Id.
110. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 112.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

13

Journal of Dispute
Resolution, Vol.
2002, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 13
OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
JOURNAL
[Vol. 2002, No. I
exempt those employment contracts in section one because they were never covered
by the statute in the first place.
When the majority assumes that nothing in the statute can be treated as
surplusage, they impute a type of legislative omniscience to Congress."' It has been
argued, however, that the legislature is far from omnipotent and waits for the courts
to determine the precise effect of a bill."2 This is not to say that each word of the
statute does not count, but that as a result of a statute's imprecision, a statute that is
the product of compromise--as is the case here--"may contain redundant language
as a by-product of the strains of the negotiating process."" 3 Because the majority
ignored the legislative context of the FAA, it failed to take into account that the
section one amendment may have been a suggestion to appease the fears of
organized labor that the FAA would somehow authorize federal enforcement of
arbitration clauses in employment contracts and collective-bargaining agreements. "4
It is not pointless, the dissent points out, to adopt an amendment in order to get a bill
passed, even if that results in redundant language." 5 So, by ignoring this legislative
context, the Court is "forced" to interpret section two broadly to avoid making
section one "redundant" or "surplusage." Addressing the legislative context, even
if it is promptly dismissed, could have prevented the Court from appearing to ignore
arguments simply because they were contrary to their own. The Court's stronger
argument for giving a broad effect to section two is its analysis of the precedent set
in Gilmer and Allied-Bruce."6
Next the Court had to determine whether the plain meaning of section one of the
FAA was apparent and if there was an argument to be made that arbitration
agreements in employment contracts were not covered by the FAA. Even where the
statutory language is not entirely clear, courts have tools at their disposal for
clarifying the meaning of a statute without reviewing its legislative history. These
interpretative tools are the canons of construction, which are rules of thumb that aid
courts in determining the meaning of legislation. One benefit of applying canons of
construction to a statute, rather than considering its legislative history, is that the
canons enable courts to focus on the text actually approved by Congress instead of
extrinsic material."'

I11. Richard A. Posner, StatutoryInterpretation-Inthe Classroomand in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 800, 812 (1983) (arguing that legislatures do not reach the precise effect of a bill because they
can wait for the courts to do so).
112. Id.
113. Id. While statutory language "is in an important sense more compact than the language of
judicial opinions and law-review articles ... it does not follow that statutes are more carefully drafted,
or even that greater care assures greater economy of language." Id.
114. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 126-27.
115. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 126-27.
116. Gilmer held that section two required the arbitration of an age discrimination claim based on an
agreement in a securities registration application, a dispute that did not arise from a "commercial deal
or merchant's sale." Gilmer,500 U.S. 20. Allied-Bruce presented an expansive reading of the words in
section two. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. 265.
117.. CBS Inc. v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1225 (11 th Cir. 2001).
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In Circuit City, the Court applied the canon of ejusdem generis to the section
one exemption provision. After ascertaining the meaning of the provision through
the use of the canon and determining that it was not ambiguous, the Court stated that
there was no need to consider the legislative history of the provision."' This is
consistent with the plain meaning approach to interpretation that "given [a]
straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative
history.""' 9 Even where there are contrary indications in the statute's legislative
history, the Supreme Court does "not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory
text that is clear."'' 0 As the Eleventh Circuit argued, "the 'plain' in 'plain meaning'
means that we look to the actual language used in a statute, not to the circumstances
that gave rise to that language....21 Any ambiguity in the statutory language must
"result from the common usage of that language, not from the parties' dueling
characterizations of what Congress 'really meant.""22
As such, the Court's failure to acknowledge that the ejusdem generis canon of
statutory interpretation may be set aside when there is a good reason to do so, a
position advocated by the dissent, is not harmful to the decision's credibility under
a strict textualist paradigm. As with all rules of statutory construction, ejusdem
generis does not apply when the context shows a contrary intention."' 2 3 However,
the majority found the exemption provision to have a clear meaning that was not
contrary to the FAA context.'24 Specifically, the Court addressed the dissent's
argument that it made no sense for the statute's drafters to exempt the workers over
whom the commerce power was most apparent at the time of enactment--seamen,
railroad employees, and other workers engaged in interstate commerce.' 25 The
Court, actually referring to the only piece of legislative history that explicitly
mentions the exclusionary clause, explained that "it is reasonable to assume that
Congress excluded 'seamen' and 'railroad employees' from the FAA for the simple
reason that it did not wish to disturb existing statutory dispute resolution schemes
'
covering those specific workers."126
With regards to the dissent's accusation that the majority "plays ostrich" to the
history behind the section one amendment, the Court does make note of Adams'
argument that the phrase "engaged in commerce" should be assessed in light of the
Commerce Clause's scope in 1925.'27 The Court even cites several cases to the effect
that in the time surrounding the FAA passage, the commerce power was very
narrow. 2 The Court denounced such a "variable standard" as causing instability,

118. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119.
119. U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997).
120. Ratzlafv. U.S., 510 U.S. 135, 147 (1994).
121. CBS, 245 F.3d at 1224.
122. CBS, 245 F.3d at 1225.
123. New Castle County v. Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 744, 752 (3d Cir. 2001).
124. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 120.
125. Id. at 120-21.
126. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 121. Congress had already regulated seamen and the railroad industry
and had already established an arbitration process for resolution of their disputes.
127. Id. at 115-16.
128. Id. at 116.
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going against prior case law, and declining to take into account the Commerce
Clause's originally narrow scope.'29
It is not clear how the rationale promoted by the Craft court and the dissent--that
statutory words such as "involved in commerce" should be subject to variable
interpretations depending on the date of adoption--would promote stability and a
better understanding of the statute at issue. It is not clear how the dissent would
promote stability because, to quote the majority, "legislative history is problematic
even when the attempt is to draw inferences from the intent of the duly appointed
committees of the Congress."' 3 When a statute is passed by Congress, it is the text
of the statute that has been voted on and approved for inclusion in our country's laws
and "not statements put in some committee report or made on the floor--and certainly
not someone's understanding of the circumstances which gave rise to the
legislation."'' The indeterminacy that the majority warns could result from the
dissent's desire to open up common jurisdictional phrases to variable interpretations
may be avoided or minimized by focusing on the text of a statute instead of its
legislative history, which is what lends credence to the majority's decision.'
The
Eleventh Circuit quoted Judge Harold Leventhal as saying, "the use of legislative
history is akin to 'entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of
the guests for one's friends.""33 The majority makes it clear that it does not need to
find its support among the dissent's "friends," namely sub-committee reports and
interest groups statements.
The split in the circuits boils down to which mode of statutory interpretation
prevails; namely, does the legislative history figure in to a court's interpretation only
after it makes a determination that the statute is ambiguous on its face, or is history
considered such an integral part of finding meaning that a court should not be bound
by the statute's text, even when the text seems clear. 3 4 In the prevailing number of
cases, courts look to the text of the statute to determine the plain meaning of the
words.'35 Only if the text is ambiguous will most courts turn to legislative history

129. Id. at 117.
130. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 120. The respondent relies upon testimony before a Senate
subcommittee hearing suggesting that the exception may have been added in response to the objections
of an interest group.
13 1. CBS, 245 F.3d at 1227.
132. CBS, 245 F.3d at 1228.
133. Id. (quoting Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511,519 (1993)).
134. The first view is represented in the majority's opinion. See Circuit City 532 U.S. at 119-21;
Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 6; Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 147; CBS, 245 F.3d at 1224-25; New Castle County, 243
F.3d 752. The second view is followed by the dissent. See Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research
Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1975) ("When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the
statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words
may appear on 'superficial examination."'); Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737,739 (2d Cir. 1945) (Judge
Learned Hand surmised that "it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not
to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or
object to accomplish whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their
meaning.").
135. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119-21; Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 6; Ratzlaf,510 U.S. at 147; CBS, 245
F.3d at 1224-25; Train, 426 U.S. at 10; New Castle County, 243 F.3d 752; Cabell, 148 F.2d 739.
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to fill in the pieces of the puzzle.'36 The Supreme Court reached the right result
because it used the words of the statute itself to determine whether the statute's
meaning was ambiguous, and upon deciding that the text was clear, rejected bringing
in legislative history to cloud the statute's plain meaning.
As mentioned above, the Court provided only a cursory discussion of the
legislative history of the FAA, but did explain why the statute's history did not play
a large role in their decision; whereas, the dissent focused on the FAA legislative
history. The way the opinions of both the majority and dissent are written could lead
one to believe that courts may pick the canons of interpretation that would result in
an interpretation that was consistent with certain policy preferences. The usual
criticism of canons, is that for "every canon one might bring to bear on a point there
is an equal and opposite canon so that the outcome of the interpretive process
depends on the choice between paired opposites--a choice that the canons themselves
do not illuminate."' 37 The majority even admits "canons of construction need not be
conclusive and are often countered, of course, by some maxim pointing in a different
direction."' 38 So, although the Court's decision is supported by the canons it used,
its decision that the statute had a "plain meaning" was reached without having to take
into account the evidence brought up by the dissent that the drafters of the FAA
never meant for the Act's provisions to apply to employment contracts.
The critics of a strict textualist approach point out that even "[e]veryday
language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it."'3 9 And
although it is possible that statutes may be written in plain language capable of
unanimous interpretation, Judge Hand once observed, "The duty of ascertaining [a
statute's] meaning is difficult enough at best, and one certain way of missing it is by
reading it literally, for words are such temperamental beings that the surest way to
lose their essence is to take them at their face." 4 ' Contrary interpretations of a
statute are almost always going to exist; the danger is that those interpretations may
have support due to the existence of contrary canons. To the extent this decision can
be called "result-based," and an attempt to further the Court's policy favoring
arbitration, the decision's validity would seem to diminish, although the majority's
decision was supported by the modes of interpretation it used.' 4'

136. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119-21; Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 6; Ratzlaf,510 U.S. at 147; CBS, 245
F.3d at 1224-25; Train, 426 U.S. at 10; New Castle County, 243 F.3d 752; Cabell, 148 F.2d 739.
137. Posner,supran. 1ll,at 806.
138. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115,
139. Matthew Schultz, Student Author, Equitable Repudiation: Toward a Doctrine of Fallible
Perfection in Statutory Interpretation, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 303, 311 (2001) (quoting Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus § 4.002 (Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc. 1921)).
140. Id. at 311.
141. S. Kathleen Isbell, Student Author, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Agreements:
Beneficent Shield or Sword of Oppression? Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 22
Whittier L. Rev. 1107, 1140 n. 303 (2001) (The opinion in Circuit City, with "Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, two of which argued so contrarily in the
Southland dissent, and all of whom are usually suspicious of expansive federal power--facing off against
Justices Steven, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, all of whom are generally sympathetic to 'liberal' as well
as federal interests--stands as a stark reminder of the result-based orientation of the current majority.").
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B. Effect of the Court's Decision
The result of the Court's decision in this case may have effects on several fronts.
Employers use arbitration agreements because they want finality in their disputes
with employees. 42 Before the instant decision, Circuits were split on whether to give
such agreements effect under the FAA thus granting them the finality that employers
desired. However, with this decision, employers will be secure in their knowledge
that an agreement to arbitrate will be enforceable if it is contained in an employment
contract. The decision should cause employers to reconsider their employment
policy strategies and may "create a situation where employers can take a much more
positive approach to controlling the process and limiting the cost of employment
disputes."'4 3 However, employers must realize that contracts containing arbitration
agreements may be declared invalid if they are unconscionable or are a product of
fraud or duress.'"
The arbitration agreement in Adam's employment contract was recently held to
be invalid by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, who was hearing the case
on remand from the Supreme Court. 45 The court held that the DRA was
procedurally unconscionable because it was a "contract of adhesion: a standard-form
contract, drafted by the party with superior bargaining power, which relegates to the
other party the option of either adhering to its terms without modification or
rejecting the contract entirely."' 46 The court noted that the DRA forces employees
to arbitrate claims against the employer but does not require Circuit City to arbitrate
its claims against employees. 47 Not only does the DRA force Adams to arbitrate his
it does so without giving him the benefit of many statutory
statutory claims,
4
remedies. 1
Although the Ninth Circuit's recent ruling in the Circuit City remand serves as
a reminder to employers that arbitration agreements must be procedurally and

142. Julie L. Waters, Student Author, Does the Battle Over Mandatory Arbitration Jeopardize the
EEOC's War in Fighting Workplace Discrimination?, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 1155, 1188 (2000).
143. Paul Peter Nicolai, Rethinking Employment Law Strategies, 56 Dis. Res. J. 67, 68 (2001).
144. Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,687. See supra text accompanying n. 22.
145. Circuit City Stores, 279 F.3d at 893. "Under California law a contract is unenforceable if it is
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable." Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs.,
Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000).
146. Id. (quoting Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145-46 (Cal. App. 1997)).
147. Id. at 893-894.
148. Id. at 894. For example, under the DRA, the remedies are limited to injunctive relief, up to one
year of back pay and up to two years of front pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages in an
amount up to the greater of the amount of back pay and front pay awarded or $5,000. By contrast, a
plaintiff in a civil suit for sexual harassment under the FEHA is eligible for all forms of relief that are
generally available to civil litigants--including appropriate punitive damages and damages for emotional
distress. See Commodore Home Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 649 P.2d 912,
914 (Cal. 1982). The DRA also requires employees to split the arbitrator's fees with Circuit City, which
the court says by itself "would render an arbitration agreement unenforceable." Finally, the DRA
imposes a strict one year statute of limitations on arbitrating claims that would deprive Adams of the
benefit of the continuing violation doctrine available in FEHA suits. See e.g. Richards v. CH2MHill,
Inc., 29 P.3d 175, 176 (Cal. 2001 ).
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substantively fair, the Supreme Court's decision that such arbitration agreements fall
under the FAA may be the green light some employers have been waiting for. In
fact, even before the ruling in Circuit City, many employers put arbitration
agreements in employment contracts to settle disputes with their employees. The
reason being that the majority of courts have been acting as if arbitration agreements
contained in employment contracts were enforceable under the FAA provisions for
many years now. 4 9 This decision just makes it official and the practice of arbitrating
employee disputes now carries the imprimatur of the Supreme Court.
C. The Legislative Response to Circuit City
There has already been a legislative response to Circuit City. A bill has been
introduced in Congress that would overrule this decision and related decisions. The
Preservation of Civil Rights Protection Act of 2001 (H.B. 2282) by Representative
Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) would amend the FAA by striking the language "of
seamen" and all that follows through "commerce."' 0 The section one exemption
provision would then read "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment."'' The bill specifically states that "any clause of any agreement" that
requires arbitration of a constitutional claim is unenforceable, but voluntary
52
arbitration and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements would be exempt.
In the Senate, Russ Feingold (D-Wisconsin) is also considering introducing a similar
bill.' In California, where this case originated, state Senator Sheila Kuehl (D-Los
Angeles) introduced a similar measure to prohibit arbitration of employment
matters. u" Senate Bill 410 would require that mandatory pre-employment arbitration
clauses be presumed "unconscionable."' 55
Although this decision was supposed to resolve the question of whether
arbitration agreements contained in employment contracts are within the FAA reach,
it appears that this is not the last we have heard of the issue ifthe legislative response
is any indication of the decision's popularity. Currently, the split in the Circuits has
been resolved in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements, which is consistent with
recent Supreme Court decisions upholding the use of arbitration in the employment
context. However, until the statutory language that caused the confusion is
amended, employees would be well advised to take binding agreements to arbitrate
employment disputes as being just that--binding.

149. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1470.
150. Lindbergh Porter, Jr., Jennie Lau, & Eugene D. Mazo, AlternativeDispute Resolution: Boosts
from the Supreme Courts, But Risksfor Over-Reaching Employers, 663 Practicing Law Instit. Lit. 351,

362 (2001).
151. Id.

152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in the present case resolves a split in the Circuits
and is the product of a broad interpretation of the FAA coverage provision and a
narrow interpretation of its exemption provision. The Court, finding that the FAA
meaning was clear on its face, declined to consider the statute's legislative history,
and thus reached a result consistent with its policy preference for arbitration: the
FAA provisions do apply to arbitration agreements found within employment
contracts. Although its decision was supported by the canons of interpretation it
used, the majority, to avoid an appearance of a "results-based" decision, may have
been better served to address the legislative history of the FAA. Given the apparent
conflict between the enacting Congress' intent as outlined by the dissent and the
courts' interpretation, the controversy over whether employees can be subjected to
mandatory arbitration will likely continue until Congress decides to act.
LISA M. EATON
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